6 research outputs found
Promoting Predictability in Business: Solutions for Overlapping Liability in International Anti-Corruption Enforcement
This Note evaluates solutions to the problems of overlapping liability in general and multi-jurisdictional disgorgement in particular. Part I traces the origins of international anti-corruption efforts and provides an overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”). It then discusses the two most significant international anti-corruption conventions: the OECD’s Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”). Part II lays out the problems created by the lack of a formal mechanism to prevent overlapping liability— a phenomenon that violates the common law concept known as double jeopardy and the analogous civil law principle ne bis in idem (not twice in the same thing). Part III proposes a formal mechanism to militate against the problems noted in Part II and argues that these provisions should be housed in a series of bilateral agreements akin to those that exist in international antitrust enforcement. Ultimately, this Note stresses the need for a more proportional and predictable method of ensuring that MNCs are not subject to overlapping liability and provides an actionable means for doing so
Promises Unfulfilled: How Investment Arbitration Tribunals Mishandle Corruption Claims and Undermine International Development
In recent years, the investment-arbitration and anti-corruption regimes have been in tension. Investment tribunals have jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes between investors and host states under international treaties that provide substantive protections for private investments. But these tribunals will typically decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if the host state asserts that corruption tainted the investment. When tribunals close their doors to ag-grieved investors, tribunals increase the risks for investors and thus raise the cost of international investment. At the same time, the decision to decline jurisdiction creates a perverse incentive for host states to turn a blind eye to corruption. Together, these distorted incentives hinder developmental goals and undermine the fight against corruption. To correct these problems, this Note proposes a framework to guide arbitral tribunals when faced with a corruption-tainted dispute. Specifically, this Note argues that when both parties participate in corruption, arbitral tribunals should invoke equitable estoppel to accept jurisdiction over the dispute. When considering the corruption claims, investment tribunals should use a contributory-fault approach that evaluates each party’s role in the corrupt act to determine the final award. This framework not only helps align the investment-arbitration and anticorruption regimes but also advances developmental objectives
Does Campaigning on Social Media Make a Difference? Evidence from candidate use of Twitter during the 2015 and 2017 UK Elections
Social media are now a routine part of political campaigns all over the
world. However, studies of the impact of campaigning on social platform have
thus far been limited to cross-sectional datasets from one election period
which are vulnerable to unobserved variable bias. Hence empirical evidence on
the effectiveness of political social media activity is thin. We address this
deficit by analysing a novel panel dataset of political Twitter activity in the
2015 and 2017 elections in the United Kingdom. We find that Twitter based
campaigning does seem to help win votes, a finding which is consistent across a
variety of different model specifications including a first difference
regression. The impact of Twitter use is small in absolute terms, though
comparable with that of campaign spending. Our data also support the idea that
effects are mediated through other communication channels, hence challenging
the relevance of engaging in an interactive fashion
Promoting Predictability in Business: Solutions for Overlapping Liability in International Anti-Corruption Enforcement
This Note evaluates solutions to the problems of overlapping liability in general and multi-jurisdictional disgorgement in particular. Part I traces the origins of international anti-corruption efforts and provides an overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”). It then discusses the two most significant international anti-corruption conventions: the OECD’s Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”). Part II lays out the problems created by the lack of a formal mechanism to prevent overlapping liability— a phenomenon that violates the common law concept known as double jeopardy and the analogous civil law principle ne bis in idem (not twice in the same thing). Part III proposes a formal mechanism to militate against the problems noted in Part II and argues that these provisions should be housed in a series of bilateral agreements akin to those that exist in international antitrust enforcement. Ultimately, this Note stresses the need for a more proportional and predictable method of ensuring that MNCs are not subject to overlapping liability and provides an actionable means for doing so